Penalties Under Revenue Statutes—Construction—Effect of Good Faith by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 8 Issue 2 
January 1923 
Penalties Under Revenue Statutes—Construction—Effect of Good 
Faith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Penalties Under Revenue Statutes—Construction—Effect of Good Faith, 8 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 131 (1923). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol8/iss2/10 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
rEVIEW OF RECENT DECISIONS
surface and of their house. The grantees were, of course, relying upon the
Kohler Act while the Pennsylvania Coal Company was relying upon the reserva-
tion it had expressly made in the deed whereby it conveyed the land to H.
Mahon et al. The Court- of Common Pleas held that the Kohler Act, if applied
to this case, would be unconstitutional. However, upon an appeal to the State
Supreme Court it was held that while the Pennsylvania Coal Company had
contract and property rights protected by the Constitution of the United States
still the statute was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. The
question arises-was this a proper exercise of the police power by the State or
was it taking property without due process of law? It is well understood that
certain values or rights which we enjoy are subject to implied limitations and
must yield to the police po %er, but such limitations must have certain limits or
the contract and due process clause are of no value. When the diminution
reaches a certain magnitude it must be an exercise of eminent domain plus just
compensation. Mr. Justice Holmes, who delivered the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States, after the case had been taken to said court, said,
"For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right. to mine it."
IVhen you take away the right to mine it it has almost the same effect for con-
stitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it, This would be the result
of the Kohler Act. While, as a general rule. property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if it goes too far it will constitute a taking. Whenever there is
such a taking it is presumed that it is wanted for a public use and even then it
is not taken without compensation. The statute in this case did not contemplate
the taking of property for a public use; neither did it contemplate giving com-
pensation to the one whose rights would be impaired. It could scarcely be said
to be a taking for public interest since the case involved only a single house-and,
since only a single private house was liable to be damaged it could not be con-
sidered a public nuisance. It was upon such reasoning as shown above that the
Supreme Court of the United States (Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting) held the
statute unconstitutional-a realization that the statute did not disclose a public
interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendants' con-
stitutionally protected rights.
PENALTIES UNDER REVENUE STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-
EFFECT OF GOOD FAITH.
A proper understanding of the case subsequently cited makes necessary the
setting out of certain revenue statutes. That is to say, Sec. 311 of the Munition
Tax Act of Sept. 8, 1916 (39 Stat. 782), provides that: "All administrative,
special and general provisions of law, relating to the assessment of taxes not
.pecifically repealed, are hereby made to apply to this title so far as applicable
and not inconsistent with its provisions." And Sec. 3176 R. S., as amended by
Sec. 16 of the Revenue Act of 1916 (39 Stat. 773), reads in part as follows: "In
case of any failure to make and file a return or list within the time prescribed by
lai or by the Collector, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall add to the
tax fifty per cent of its amount, except that when a return is voluntarily and
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without notice from the creditor filed after such time and it is showir that the
failure to file was due to a reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, no such
addition shall be made to the tax."
A case which involved the construction of the above provisions was Dayton
Bronze Bearing Co. v. Gilligan, 281 Fed. 709, decided June 6, 1922. The Dayton
Bronze Bearing Company entered into a contract with the Recording and Com-
puting Machines Company-by the terms of which the former company agreed
to mold material furnished and owned by the latter company into certain rough
and preliminary forms, in which forms it was to be returned to the Recording
Company as castings. The castings were in turn used by the Recording Com-
pany in the manufacturing of time fuses to be attached to shrapnel shells manu-
factured by other corporations for the use of the Russian Government. The evi-
dence showed that the Dayton Bronze Bearing Company did nothing except mold
the materijl furnished it into rough castings for the Recording and Computing
Machines t.ompany and that it believed, in good faith, that it was not manu-
facturing munitions so as to make itself liable for the payment of a tax under
the Munition Tax Act. The company also secured the advice of reputable coun-
se, which was to the effect that it was not liable for the payment of a Muni-
tions Tax. As a result the company did not make or file the required list within
the time prescribed by law. Finally, upon the advice of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, the company filed a return under protest. After filing the return the
Commissioner assessed a tax against the company together with the fifty per
cent penalty as required by the statute set out above. The fifty per cent penalty
was paid by the company under protest. This judgment of the District Court
was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for review on writ of error, in which
court, it was held that the company should recover the money it had paid as a
penalty since the above law was not applicable in this case. The main argument
of the Dayton Bronze Bearing Company was to the effect that it was acting in
good faith and that its failure to comply with the above statutes was due to its
ignorance-that it did not think its work would render it liable to be taxed under
the above statute. The ruling of the Treasury Department seems to be that
"Where the attendant and surrounding circumstances have a tendency to cast
doubt and suspicion upon a taxpayer, a plea of mere ignorance is not sufficient to
constitute a reasonable cause for failure to make and file a report within the
time prescribed by law for the purpose of being relieved of the penalty." How-
ever, in the present case the surrounding and attendant circumstances have no
tendency to cast a doubt or suspicion upon the taxpayer so that the above ruling
of the Treasury Department would not apply. The fact that the company se-
cured competent legal advice to determine the question of its liability shows that
it was endeavoring to act honestly and fairly. Where there is a statute impos-
ing a penalty for certain acts or omissions (as the statute above) Courts are
reluctant to give force to such penalty unless there has been a substantial de-
linquency-unless the taxpayer has been willfully or intentionally negligent. Since,
in the above case, the corporation took the fairest and best action within its
knowledge, the ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals in holding the penalty did
not apply, seems to be just according to the circumstances of the case.
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